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REVIEW OF INITIATIVES BY THE
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, 2000–2010
Gerald F. Uelmen*
The single-subject rule has been part of the California Constitution
since 1948. However, the California Supreme Court had never declared
that an initiative violated this requirement until Senate of California v.
Jones in 1999. This ruling seemed to suggest that the court would
control the ambitions of the fourth branch of government—initiative
drafters. Since Jones, the California Supreme Court, in six different
cases, has examined initiatives for compliance with the single-subject
rule and the prohibition on constitutional revisions. By reviewing all six
of these cases, this Article explains that the original hope of Jones’s
impact on initiatives was a mere fantasy because the single-subject rule
and prohibition on constitutional revisions have again been reduced to
historical artifacts.

* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A., Loyola Marymount
University; J.D., LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center.
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At the turn of the millennium, in a fit of pre-9/11 optimism, I
greeted the California Supreme Court’s decision in Senate of
California v. Jones 1 as a harbinger of welcome and long-overdue
change. 2 Although the “single-subject” requirement hasd been part of
the California Constitution since 1948, 3 Jones was the first
California Supreme Court decision to declare that an initiative
measure violated that requirement, forcing its removal from the
ballot even though the necessary signatures to qualify it had been
collected. 4 The decision invalidated the Let the Voters Decide Act of
2000, which would have amended the California Constitution to
reduce legislative salaries, mandated voter approval of any increases,
and required the California Supreme Court to adopt plans for the
decennial reapportionment of legislative and congressional districts. 5
The conclusion that I authored in a 2001 article conjured up visions
of George W. Bush standing on the deck of the USS Abraham
Lincoln declaring “Mission Accomplished.” I declared:
The California Supreme Court decision in Jones should
send a strong message to the industry that drafts and
promotes initiative measures as California’s “fourth
branch” of government. The door has been opened to
greater use of pre-election review of procedural challenges
to initiatives, lowering the threshold from the previously
required “clear showing” of invalidity to a “strong
likelihood” of invalidity. The requirement that initiatives
embrace a single subject has finally grown some teeth
because of the court’s willingness to look beyond the
language of the initiative itself to extraneous evidence of
“logrolling,” and due to the analysis of the potential for
voter confusion or deception that closely resembles the
“public understanding” test . . . .
While Jones avoided the question of whether the
initiative at issue was a constitutional revision, there are
compelling reasons to give this question the same access to
1. 988 P.2d 1089 (Cal. 1999).
2. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Handling Hot Potatoes: Judicial Review of California Initiatives
After Senate v. Jones, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1000, 1010 (2001).
3. Id. at 999; see CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
4. See Uelmen, supra note 2, at 999.
5. Id. at 1004.
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pre-election review as the single-subject question, and to
enforce it with similar vigor. 6
This Article briefly reviews the California Supreme Court decisions
since Jones that have addressed this issue to demonstrate the extent
to which I was fantasizing when I looked to the court to control the
ambitions of our fourth branch of government. The single-subject
rule and the prohibition of constitutional revision through initiatives
have again been reduced to historical artifacts, and the pre-election
review of initiatives has been severely limited. In the eleven years
since Senate v. Jones, the California Supreme Court has addressed
the appropriateness of pre-election review or examined initiatives for
compliance with the single-subject rule or the prohibition of
constitutional revision through initiatives six times.
1. Manduley v. Superior Court 7
In this case, the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition
21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998,
after voters approved it. 8 A strong single-subject challenge was
presented; it focused on the inclusion of amendments greatly
expanding the Three Strikes law to include a number of offenses that
had nothing to do with gang violence or juvenile crime. 9 Proposition
21 “broadened the circumstances in which prosecutors are authorized
to file charges against minors 14 years of age and older in the
criminal division of the superior court, rather than in the juvenile . . .
court.” 10 Relying on the approach enumerated in Jones, the plaintiffs
argued that there was no public understanding of the breadth of
Proposition 21’s provisions. 11 The majority opinion by Chief Justice
George 12 rejected that argument, finding one line in the legislative
analyst’s analysis and one in the attorney general’s official summary
mentioning that the initiative “designates additional crimes as violent

6. Id. at 1024–25.
7. 41 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2002).
8. Id. at 8–9.
9. See id. at 27–28.
10. Id. at 38 (Moreno, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 31 n.12 (majority opinion) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the initiative
constituted an instance of “logrolling,” or combining in a single measure several unrelated
provisions that might not have garnered majority support if considered separately).
12. Id. at 8.
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and serious felonies . . . .” 13 He wrote, “We must assume the voters
duly considered and comprehended these materials.” 14 Justice
Moreno, however, responded in a concurring opinion that should
have been labeled a dissent. He wrote:
[W]hile it is to be hoped that voters carefully study their
ballot guides, the realistic premise behind the single-subject
rule is that many voters do not, and the ballot measures
should be simple enough to be fairly well described in the
title and summary. The less rigorously we enforce the
single-subject rule, the more we are compelled to rely on
implausible assumptions about voters’ understanding of a
ballot measure’s intricacies.
This lack of notice to voters is especially troublesome
because the Three Strikes law is itself a substantial and
controversial piece of legislation, the amendment of which
merits the careful attention of the voters. 15
2. Costa v. Superior Court 16
In this case, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate
District, granted a pre-election review of Proposition 77, one of
several reapportionment schemes that have proposed using retired
judges to draw the boundaries. 17 After examining Proposition 77, the
court removed it from the ballot on the ground that there were
discrepancies between the version circulated to the voters and the
version submitted to the attorney general for the ballot. 18
The California Supreme Court reversed and ordered the
initiative placed on the ballot, finding that the discrepancies were
minor and inadvertent. 19 The court also noted that people do not read
an initiative measure before they sign a petition anyway, so no one
was fooled. 20 The voters defeated the measure, and although that
rendered the case moot, the supreme court wrote an opinion to
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Id. at 32 (quoting Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1085 (Cal. 1990)).
Id. at 39 (Moreno, J., concurring).
128 P.3d 675 (Cal. 2006).
Id. at 681–82.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 696–97.
See id. at 699.
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further explain its pre-election ruling. 21 That opinion declared that
although the court of appeal was wrong on the merits, it was correct
to grant a pre-election review. The supreme court declared:
[B]ecause the question at issue in such a case is whether the
initiative measure has satisfied the constitutional or
statutory procedural prerequisites necessary to qualify it for
the ballot, it is logical and appropriate for a court to
consider such a claim prior to the election, because if the
threshold procedural prerequisites have not been satisfied
the measure is not entitled to be submitted to the voters.
Unlike a challenge to the substantive validity of a proposed
measure, it cannot properly be suggested that it would be
premature to consider such a claim prior to the election,
because the focus of the issue is solely upon whether the
measure has qualified for the ballot, and not upon the
validity or invalidity of the measure were it to be approved
by the voters. 22
Costa was a 4–3 decision authored by Chief Justice George, 23 and
the majority included a justice of the court of appeal sitting by
designation. 24 Justices Kennard and Moreno dissented on the ground
that any variation between the language circulated for signature and
the language submitted to the attorney general should invalidate the
initiative 25 without the court inquiring whether the difference was
minor or major. Justice Werdegar dissented on the ground that the
supreme court should not render opinions in cases that are moot. 26
3. Californians for an Open Primary v. McPherson 27
While this case did not directly involve a popular initiative, it
did involve a constitutional requirement analogous to the singlesubject rule. 28 When the legislature refers constitutional amendments
to the people for a vote, the California Constitution requires that
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 684.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 675–76.
Id. at 702.
See id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
See id. at 708 (Werdegar, J., concurring and dissenting).
134 P.3d 299 (Cal. 2006).
Id.
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“[e]ach amendment shall be so prepared and submitted that it can be
voted on separately.” 29 In this case, the legislature designed its
proposed amendments to subvert a popular initiative that had
qualified for the ballot that would require open primaries. 30 The
legislature proposed an alternative, more restrictive open primary
combined with a measure to accelerate bond repayments. 31 The bond
measure was calculated to make the voters think that the measure
would “save them millions of dollars.” 32
Once again, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate
District, invalidated the measure on a pre-election review, but instead
of withdrawing it from the ballot entirely, the court fashioned a
remedy of bifurcation, requiring the two amendments to be submitted
to the voters separately. 33 After the voters adopted both measures, the
California Supreme Court granted review and vacated the court of
appeal’s judgment. 34 Holding that the separate-vote requirement
should be construed consistent with the single-subject rule, the
supreme court agreed that the two amendments violated the rule, but
that there was no constitutional authority for the bifurcation remedy
that the court of appeal fashioned. 35 Then, although the measures had
been submitted to the voters in violation of the constitution, the court
concluded it would be inappropriate to invalidate them since the
voters had separately approved them. 36 By eliminating the remedy of
bifurcation for single-subject violations, however, the court upped
the ante for pre-election review of single-subject challenges.
4. Independent Energy Producers Association v. McPherson 37
Proposition 80 was fashioned in the wake of California’s
electricity meltdown, which was widely blamed on deregulation. 38
The proposition would have granted extensive new powers to the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
Californians for an Open Primary, 134 P.3d at 301.
Id.
Id. at 301 n.3.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 331.
See id. at 330.
Id. at 331.
136 P.3d 178 (Cal. 2006).
See id. at 182.

Winter 2011]

INITIATIVE REVIEWS

665

Public Utilities Commission (PUC) to regulate energy producers. 39
The Independent Energy Producers Association brought suit to
invalidate the measure on the ground that the California Constitution
grants “plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of this
constitution” 40 to the legislature to grant additional powers to the
PUC. 41 The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District,
granted pre-election review, reasoning that the challenge was not to
the measure’s substantive terms but to whether the initiative’s
procedural device was even available to do what Proposition 80
proposed. 42 The court of appeal ruled “Proposition 80 is
unquestionably invalid on its face because . . . it runs afoul of a plain
and unambiguous provision of our state Constitution . . . that
effectively precludes use of the initiative process to accomplish what
Proposition 80 proposes to do.” 43 The court concluded that
“preelection review is proper, indeed essential.” 44
The California Supreme Court reversed, restoring the measure to
the ballot. 45 Proposition 80 was defeated. 46 Then, as in Costa, the
court issued an opinion after the election despite the case being
moot. 47 Unlike in Costa, however, the court held that pre-election
review was not appropriate. 48 While Chief Justice George authored 49
a persuasive opinion grounded in legislative history, he also
distinguished much of the language in Jones that encouraged pretrial review of initiatives. 50 Chief Justice George said that the
language granting plenary authority to the legislature was not
intended to deny that power to the initiative process. 51 He wrote:

39. Id.
40. Id. at 180 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 5).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 182–83.
43. Id. at 183.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Lynda Gledhill, Attempt to Restore Regulation of Utilities Fails to Generate Voters’
Support, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 9, 2005, at A17, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2005-1109/news/17399129_1_energy-policy-energy-giants-independent-energy-producers.
47. Indep. Energy, 136 P.3d at 180.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 179.
50. Id. at 184–85.
51. See id. at 188.
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[A] contention that an initiative measure is invalid because
the measure cannot lawfully be enacted through the
initiative process is a type of claim that generally will not
become moot if the initiative is approved by the voters at
the election. Because this type of claim is potentially
susceptible to resolution either before or after an election,
there is good reason for a court to be even more cautious
than when it is presented with the type of procedural claim
at issue in Costa before deciding that it is appropriate to
resolve such a claim prior to an election rather than wait
until after the election. Of course, as this court noted in
Senate v. Jones, potential costs are incurred in postponing
the judicial resolution of a challenge to an initiative
measure until after the measure has been submitted to and
approved by the voters, and such costs appropriately can be
considered by a court in determining the propriety of
preelection intervention. Nonetheless, because this type of
challenge is one that can be raised and resolved after an
election, deferring judicial resolution until after the
election—when there will be more time for full briefing and
deliberation—often will be the wiser course. 52
This language, of course, does not bode well for pre-election review
regarding the claim that an initiative undertakes a constitutional
revision.
5. Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency v. Verjil 53
This case is difficult to reconcile with Independent Energy,
although the California Supreme Court decided the two cases only
thirty-five days apart. 54 Here, in a pre-election review, the California
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, invalidated a San
Bernardino County initiative that would have required voter approval
for future increases in water rates. 55 The supreme court agreed,
reasoning that although voters had the power to lower water rates by
initiative, the Bighorn-Desert View Water Agency’s Board’s attempt
to limit future increases violated the exclusive delegation rule, which
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 184–85 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
138 P.3d 220 (Cal. 2006).
Id. at 220; Indep. Energy, 136 P.3d at 178.
Verjil, 138 P.3d at 222–23.

Winter 2011]

INITIATIVE REVIEWS

667

bars initiative measures that infringe on the power of the agency’s
governing board to set its water-delivery rates and charges. 56 In
addressing the appropriateness of pre-election review, however,
Justice Kennard’s unanimous opinion 57 simply asserted,
When a significant part of a proposed initiative measure is
invalid, the measure may not be submitted to the voters.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the
initiative could not be placed on the ballot, and it properly
granted judgment for the Agency, and the Court of Appeal
correctly affirmed the trial court’s judgment, although its
reasoning differed substantially from the reasoning we use
here. 58
There is no mention of Chief Justice George’s opinion in
Independent Energy, which Justice Kennard had joined. 59
6. Strauss v. Horton 60
This ruling is well known to everyone because it upheld
Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to overrule
the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage Cases, 61
and because it again outlawed gay marriages in California. What is
not widely appreciated, however, is the Strauss opinion’s narrowing
of the arguments available to challenge an initiative measure seeking
to revise the constitution. Chief Justice George rejected the argument
that an initiative depriving citizens of a fundamental right is a
constitutional revision. The chief justice concluded that only a
measure that makes “far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan” 62 or “substantially alter[s] the basic
governmental framework set forth in our Constitution” can qualify as
a constitutional revision. 63 In her concurring opinion, Justice
Werdegar correctly asserted, “[t]his is wrong.” 64 She explained:
56. Id. at 230.
57. Id. at 221
58. Id. at 230.
59. Indep. Energy, 136 P.3d at 194.
60. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
61. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
62. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 98 (quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 22 Cal.3d 208, 223 (1978)).
63. Id. at 98 (quoting Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1319 (Cal. 1991)).
64. Id. at 124 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
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In fact, until today the court has gone only so far as to say
that a “qualitative revision includes one that involves a
change in the basic plan of California government, i.e., a
change in its fundamental structure or the foundational
powers of its branches. 65 . . . Today, the majority changes
“includes” to “is,” thus foreclosing other possibilities. 66
At oral argument, Justice Moreno asked whether repealing the
equal protection clause of the California Constitution would be a
constitutional revision. 67 Counsel for the interveners responded that a
simple majority could amend the state constitution by initiative to
eliminate the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 68 In his
passionate dissent in Strauss, Justice Moreno concluded that:
[R]equiring discrimination against a minority group on the
basis of a suspect classification strikes at the core of the
promise of equality that underlies our California
Constitution and thus represents such a drastic and farreaching change in the nature and operation of our
governmental structure that it must be considered a
‘revision’ of the state constitution . . . . 69
The problem with this argument is that In re Marriage Cases had just
created the fundamental protection that Justice Moreno extolled.
Thus, Justice Moreno seemed to be saying that the California
Supreme Court can revise the constitution, but the legislature or the
people cannot unless they convene a constitutional convention.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing the summation of these six cases, it is readily
apparent that Jones was not a harbinger of change, but was instead a
hiccup of sorts, probably inspired by the California Supreme Court’s
distaste for taking on the job of redistricting. Pre-election review is
again a matter of judicial grace, with no consistency in how it is
dispensed. Manduley restored the single-subject rule to its
amorphous, ineffective past. 70 A claim that a measure works as a
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 124–25 (quoting Eu, 816 P.2d at 1318).
Id. at 125.
See id. at 138 (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 32 (Cal. 2002).
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constitutional revision has been taken off the table for pre-election
review and has been severely restricted by Chief Justice George’s
sleight of hand in Strauss.
I find it quite ironic that the chief justice has often been heard to
bemoan the abuse of California’s initiative process. When inducted
into the American Academy of Arts and Sciences last year in Boston,
he used the occasion to address “the perils of direct democracy.” 71
He posed this rhetorical question, with little mystery as to how he
would answer it:
A student of government might reasonably ask: Does the
voter Initiative . . . remain a positive contribution in the
form in which it now exists in 21st century California? Or,
despite its original objective—to curtail special interests . . .
has the voter Initiative now become the tool of the very
types of special interests it was intended to control, and an
impediment to the effective functioning of a true
democratic process? 72
I would pose another rhetorical question for the chief justice: To
what extent does the unbridled power of the initiative in twenty-first
century California reflect the California Supreme Court’s failure to
enforce the constitutional limits on its use?
To conclude, I would like to return to a metaphor I first
employed while greeting Jones as our potential savior:
The initiative has thus become a fourth branch of
government, with its own industrial complex available to
draft and qualify measures on a recurring basis. Like the
carnivorous plant in the movie Little Shop of Horrors, 73 the
initiative industry opens its mouth in anticipation of every
election, says, “feed me!” and then grows larger. Each time
Californians go to the polls, they expect to encounter a
dozen ballot propositions, to determine questions as basic
as who should go to jail, who should be executed, who

71. Ronald M. George, Chief Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, Induction Ceremony at the
American Academy of Arts & Sciences: The Perils of Direct Democracy: The California
Experience 7–9 (Oct. 10, 2009), available at http://www.amacad.org/publications/bulletin/
winter2010/ceremony.pdf.
72. Id. at 9.
73. LITTLE SHOP OF HORRORS (Warner Bros. 1986).
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should pay taxes and how much they should pay, and who
can marry whom. 74
In November 2010, we rejected proposals to legalize marijuana, 75
junk the reform of redistricting now underway, 76 repeal the Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 77 and fund state parks with a
vehicle-registration surcharge. 78 We approved a proposal to allow the
legislature to enact a budget with a simple majority. 79 Some of these
are good ideas; some are bad. The problem with deciding which are
which by the initiative process is that the enactment of an initiative,
and often the defeat, takes the issue off the legislative table. Our
ability to regulate and fine-tune the application of any changes is
eliminated. The only way we can amend an initiative is with another
initiative. 80

74. Uelmen, supra note 2, at 999–1000.
75. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER
GUIDE
92
(2010),
available
at
INFORMATION
http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig2010/general/pdf/english/complete-vig.pdf (providing the proposed text
of Proposition 19).
76. Id. at 115 (providing the proposed text of Proposition 27).
77. See id. at 106 (providing the proposed text of Proposition 23).
78. Id. at 97 (providing the proposed text of Proposition 21).
79. Id. at 113 (providing the proposed text of Proposition 25).
80. People v. Kelly, 222 P.3d 186 (Cal. 2010).

